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Abstract
The lessons from financial crisis illustrate the importance 
of risk management; corporate governance is increasingly 
being considered an important part of risk management. 
In this paper, the author discusses the role of corporate 
governance in risk management in developing markets 
from shareholders vote,  board of directors,  top 
management, and auditors. This paper also presents 
recommendations to improve corporate governance in 
order to strengthen risk management.
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INTRODUCTION
The frequent financial crisis has seen the collapse of 
numerous businesses internationally, illustrating that 
no industry or jurisdiction is immune from inadequate 
or inappropriate risk management. All businesses 
should have the capacity to develop policy with a full 
appreciation of risk and the development of a suitable set 
of operating procedures in order to respond to changing 
circumstances in a timely manner. The lessons from 
financial crisis illustrate the need for appropriate risk 
management, planning, and control and the need for 
companies to reassess their governance structure to ensure 
adequate risk management.
Meanwhile, corporate governance has attracted 
considerable attention over the past decades, leading to 
recommended codes of practice, conceptual models, and 
empirical studies. A growing number of empirical studies 
have demonstrated that good corporate governance 
contributes to better investor protection, lower costs 
of capital, reduced earnings manipulations, increased 
company market value, improved stock returns, and even 
economic growth. Corporate governance has been seen 
at the forefront of establishing standards of corporate 
ethics aimed at reducing unscrupulous corporate practices 
while preserving a fair business environment. Corporate 
governance is also increasingly being considered an 
important part of corporate risk management and the logic 
is poor corporate governance is viewed as risky, whereas 
creditors and investors view good corporate governance 
as a sign of strength in a corporation.
In this paper, the author discusses the relationship 
between corporate governance and risk management, and 
put forwards recommendations to improve governance 
structure to manage corporate risk.
1 .   T H E  R O L E  O F  C O R P O R AT E 
G O V E R N A N C E  I N S T R U M E N T S  I N 
AFFECTING CORPORATE RISK
The governance structure can be divided into the internal 
governance and external governance, which can affect 
corporate risk. Economic and financial theory suggests the 
instruments mentioned below affect corporate risk.
1.1  Shareholders Votes
The shareholders’ votes play an important role in risk 
prevention, and there should be a negative relationship 
between corporate risk and shareholders rights. Each 
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shareholder has been delegated with a vote to play a 
role in the operations of a firm and can use their vote in 
removing and appointing the board of directors. They can 
make decisions about the compensation of employees in 
a firm and can also participate in financial decisions of a 
firm, including the rules of financial risk management.
The shareholders enjoy the right to represent 
themselves on the board. They are also allowed to gain 
all kinds of information from the officials of the firm 
such as analysts, board of directors and employees. 
The easy access to public and private information by 
the shareholders can reduce the information asymmetry 
between the shareholders and managers, reduce the 
agency cost and results in improved firm performance. 
Unfortunately, the majority shareholders are negative 
in affecting risk management in developing market 
(China as an example). The controlling shareholder 
equity is highly concentrated. The equity interest 
of minority shareholders is highly fragmented, it is 
difficult to check and balance between the shareholders. 
The controlling shareholder can easily manipulate the 
shareholders' meeting resolution; it is more likely for the 
largest shareholder to occupy the interests of minority 
shareholders. The controlling shareholders achieve their 
own revenue maximization through controlling assets 
restructuring and equity transactions, which will bring a 
great deal of the operating and decision-making risk.
1.2  Role of Board of Directors
The board of directors can play an important role in risk 
management. The corporate risk is also appropriately dealt 
with when the board performs its fiduciary duties such as 
monitoring the activities of management and selecting the 
staff for the firm. The board can also appoint and monitor 
the work of an independent auditor to avoid the related 
risks. The board of directors can resolve internal conflicts 
and decrease the agency cost in a firm. The member of a 
board should also be accountable to the shareholders for 
their decisions.
The board consists of two directors: outsider 
(independent) and insider directors. The majority of 
directors in a board should make rational decisions to 
add value for shareholders and avoid risk. The role of 
independent directors is very important to improve risk 
management as they can monitor the firm and force 
the managers to take unbiased decisions. The insider 
directors are also important in safeguarding the interests 
of shareholders. They provide the shareholders with 
important financial information, which will decrease 
the information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders. The board size should be chosen with the 
optimal combination of inside and outside directors for 
the value creation and risk prevention.
The board of directors in developing market is 
unlikely to be responsible for the whole shareholders, 
as the weak judiciary and regulatory authority in this 
market enables the directors to be involved in biased 
decision-making that serves the interests of the majority 
shareholders; meanwhile, in the case of high concentration 
of shareholding, the largest shareholder can influence 
the operations of the board through electing insider 
directors to be easy to control the Board .The actual 
controller generally serves as chairman of the board, so 
the independence of the board is difficult to get protection 
providing a disadvantage to the firm.
1.3  Role of CEO (Chief Executive Officer) 
and Managers
A Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is the highest-ranking 
corporate officer (executive) or administrator in charge 
of total management of an organization, and can play an 
important role in risk management. The CEO can follow 
and incorporate governance provisions in a firm to avoid 
risk. An individual appointed as a CEO of a corporation, 
company, organization, or agency typically reports to 
the board of directors, the decisions of the board about 
hiring and firing a CEO and their proper remuneration and 
tenure have an important bearing on risk management. In 
developing market, the board is easily controlled by the 
CEO; the CEO is more likely to make decisions for his 
own interest, which adds the risk for the firm.
Managers can play an important  role in r isk 
management. They can reduce the agency cost in a 
firm by decreasing the information asymmetry, which 
results in improving risk management. The rights of 
minority shareholders are suppressed and the actions 
of the managers mostly favor the majority shareholders 
in developing market, meanwhile the management and 
the shareholders in these markets rarely use the tools of 
hostile takeover and incentives to control the actions of 
managers, which can’t help to strengthen risk prevention.
1.4  Role of Auditors
The role of auditors is important in implementing 
corporate governance principles and improving risk 
management. The principles of corporate governance 
suggest that auditors should work independently and 
perform their duties with professional care. In case of any 
financial manipulation, the auditors are held accountable 
for their actions as the availability of transparent financial 
information reduces the information asymmetry and helps 
to avoid the risks, especially financial risk.
However, in developing market, auditors tend 
towards manipulate the financial reports of the firm and 
serve the interests of he majority shareholders further 
disadvantaging the minority shareholders. The weak 
corporate law and different accounting standards also 
deteriorate the performance of the auditors and create 
financial instability in developing market.
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2.  IMPROVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
TO STRENGTHEN RISK MANAGEMENT
Corporate governance structure is sound directly affect the 
business decision-making, and will also affect the corporate 
risk. It is more important for companies in developing 
market; this paper puts forward the following suggestions.
2.1  Optimize the Ownership Structure and 
Introduce Institutional Investors
There are many defects in governance structure which cause 
or exacerbate corporate risk; the biggest drawback is the 
excessive concentration of ownership in developing market, 
the majority shareholders, especially the largest shareholder 
can not can not only manipulate the resolution of the 
general meeting of shareholders, but also control the board 
of directors and managers, they may harm the interests of 
minority shareholders for their own interests, moreover, 
the weak judiciary and regulatory authority in this market, 
decision-making is lack of binding and scientific procedure, 
it is not conducive to the development of the company. The 
ownership must be diversified in order to solve the problems 
of corporate governance.
Controlling shareholders need transfer some of the 
shares to small investors, or transfer to institutional 
investors; Transferring to the former will not achieve 
the desired effect, because the “free-rider” phenomenon 
is prevalent for small and medium-sized investors in 
developing market, they are accustomed to vote with 
“foot”, therefore reducing controlling shareholder equity 
ratio will not affect its control over. The introduction 
of powerful institutional investors is necessary to be 
introduced, they can accept a relatively large proportion 
of the shares and have the motivation and ability 
to participate in corporate governance, and internal 
controlled problem will be solved to some extent.
2.2  Improve Board of Directors and Board 
of Supervisors
Improving the performance of the board is a global 
problem, but this demand is much more urgent in 
developing markets, these markets are also facing the 
various deficiencies existing in market mechanisms. 
Because in these markets, the social supervision system 
composed of the forces has not formed, the board is 
bound to be last line of defense to protect shareholders, 
especially minority shareholders, thereby it is vital to 
increase the independence and scientific decision-making 
of board of directors, to strengthen the oversight functions 
of board of supervisors.
First of all, in the building of the board of directors, 
in order to ensure the board's independence and scientific 
decision-making, the independent directors system must 
be improved, on the other hand, the practice of the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange deserves referring and popularizing, 
some rules should be constructed to limit the proportion 
of board members belonging to the relationship, spouse, 
lineal relatives of the second generation, three generations 
of collateral blood, while increasing the proportion of 
non-managerial staff as a directors; at the same time, 
chairman-CEO duality should be avoided, thus both the 
scientific decision-making of the board and effective 
supervision of the management can be enhanced. In order 
to strengthen internal control on decision-making, the 
board should build audit committee to play the role of 
audit in risk management.
Secondly, we should pay more attention to the 
construction of board of supervisors. Supervisors are 
usually held by the shareholders or employees, their 
election is basically manipulated by the controlling 
shareholders or the board of directors, their identity is 
destined to not really fulfill their supervisory functions. 
In order to enhance the independence of the board of 
supervisors, we recommend to increase supervisor’s 
composition sources, such as creditors on behalf of 
external supervisors; meanwhile it is necessary to further 
improve the supervision and inspection of board of 
supervisors, we can expand the scope of supervision 
and give some hard and fast approval to increase the 
effectiveness of supervision, allow supervisors to carry 
out personal inspection and supervision on board of 
directors to improve the efficiency of supervision by.
2.3  Strengthen the Construction of Balances and 
Incentive Mechanisms
Risk management need to build a proper check and 
balance mechanism among the shareholders’ meeting, 
the board of directors, board of supervisors, managers. 
And it need build a set of effective incentive and restraint 
mechanisms for top management.
First of all, the cumulative voting system should 
be introduced in the selection of the members of the 
board, members of the board of supervisors, and the core 
management. We should improve the right to speak the 
small and medium investors, and reduce negative effects 
of the second tier of agents.
Secondly, we must accelerate the introduction of 
professional managers, professional managers should be 
employed as much as possible, and ensure their independent 
exercise of the operating right in the system, so we can 
avoid the control of the controlling shareholder, and ensure 
that ownership and management is separated and balanced.
Finally, we should improve the incentive and restraint 
mechanisms of management (Board of Directors, the 
operator), especially perfect and implement equity 
incentive plan, we should take full account of the degree 
and duration of the incentive problem in this process.
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